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CIVIL RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW*
By

DOROTHY

and GLENNA

Y.

KIRKLEY**
L. STONE ***

The volume of civil rights and constitutional law cases decided by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit continues to rise
steadily. This article is a selection of 1975 cases deciding substantive and
procedural issues which, in the authors' opinion, are noteworthy for the
general reader. The selection is by no means exhaustive.
I.

DISCHARGE FROM PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT

Again this year, the Fifth Circuit decided a number of cases evolving
from the discharge of non-tenured faculty members and other public employees without civil service protection. Perry v. Sinderman' and Board of
Regents v. Roth' established the guiding legal principles when such employees claim that they are entitled to procedural due process prior to the
employer's refusal to renew a contract. And the Fifth Circuit continues to
be guided by its pre-Roth and pre-Sinderman decision of Ferguson v.
Thomas.' These decisions require that a non-tenured employee demonstrate that he has either a property or liberty interest in his specific public
job before the fourteenth amendment requires procedural due process.
Even if procedural due process is not required, however, a public employee
may not be discharged for the exercise of substantive constitutional rights,
and an administrative hearing may be ordered by the court to determine
the employee's allegation that his dismissal was based on constitutionally
protected activity.
In Kaprelianv. Texas Woman's University,' a non-tenured professor was
advised privately that she would not be rehired because of unprofessional
conduct and disloyalty to the university. She rejected the university's offer
that an ad hoc committee consider her case and filed a 42 U.S.C.A. §1983
complaint alleging that her contract was terminated because of allegations
of unprofessional conduct and disloyalty. The lower court held that the
allegations of the complaint established a "liberty" interest protected by
* This survey does not cover constitutional criminal cases, which are included in the
criminal law article, and Title VII cases, which are included in the labor law article. A section
on practice and procedure in civil rights cases is included.
** Assistant United States Attorney, Northern District of Georgia; admitted to practice
in Georgia. University of Texas (B.A., 1968); Emory University (J.D., 1971).
*** Assistant United States Attorney, Northern District of Georgia; admitted to practice
in Georgia. University of Tennessee (B.A., 1969); Emory University (J.D., 1972).
1. 408 U.S. 593, 92 S. Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972).
2. 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed. 2d 548 (1972).
3. 430 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1970).
4. 509 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1975).
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the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and ordered that a
tribunal, other than the ad hoc committee originally proposed by the
school, hear the case. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the plaintiff
had established neither a liberty interest in her position nor any inherent
defect in the ad hoc committee. The lower court had erred in finding a
"liberty" interest based solely on the allegations in the complaint, all
denied by the defendants.5 The court makes clear that a deprivation of a
plaintiff's "liberty" requires public stigmatization apart from the defense
of the lawsuit. Moreover, if the lower court finds that a hearing is required,
it must order it conducted in accordance with the minimal procedures
established by Ferguson, but the court cannot mandate the composition
of the hearing body unless there is evidence in the record to support a
finding of lack of impartiality. Suspicion is insufficient.'
In LaBorde v. Franklin Parish School,7 the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
summary judgment granted on the school board's motion. The case arose
after a high school teacher was not granted tenure at the expiration of the
statutory three-year probationary period. The teacher's federal complaint
alleged both a property and liberty interest requiring a hearing. Relying
on the Louisiana Supreme Court decision in State ex rel Piper v. Baton
Rouge ParishSchool Board," the court found that a Louisiana teacher had
no expectation of tenure where she was notified within a reasonable time
after the end of the probationary period that tenure would not be granted.
Therefore, Roth required the Fifth Circuit's holding that the plaintiff had
no property interest. Likewise, no infringement of the plaintiff's liberty
was shown The defendant board had acted to minimize any possible
adverse effects by notifying the plaintiff privately and by not communicating to other school boards.
0
Roane v. CallisburgIndependent School District1
held that a former
school superintendent did have an expectation of continued employment
under state law, so procedural due process protection was required. The
defendant school board had adopted a rule providing that after the first
year a superintendent should be elected for a term of two to five years.
Both the plaintiff's predecessor and his successor were treated in accordance with this policy, which was authorized by state law." Additionally,
the court found that the board had acknowledged the applicability of this
policy to the plaintiff by initially accepting his resignation to be effective
at the end of the first two year period. Once the property interest is recog5. Id. at 138.
6. Id. at 138-40.
7. 510 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1975).
8. 213 La. 885, 35 So.2d 804 (1948).
9. Markwell v. Culwell, 515 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir. 1975), and Moore v. Knowles, 512 F.2d
72 (5th Cir. 1975), also quickly disposed of "property" claims by untenured teachers.
10. 511 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1975).
11. Tex. Educ. Code § 23-28 (1972).
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nized, Perry v. Sinderman requires that a hearing be held to determine
whether good cause exists for the dismissal. Because the defendant board
had held two post-termination hearings, the district court examined the
entire record to determine whether there was good cause for the discharge.
That court found there was not sufficient reason for a dismissal and ordered plaintiff's reinstatement and a back pay award. The Fifth Circuit
affirmed, finding that the reason for the discharge was the plaintiff's publicly expressed views concerning classroom construction which conflicted
with the board's position, a constitutionally insufficient basis for discharge."
Ortwein v. Mackey' 3 considered a claim that a non-tenured faculty
member's liberty interest had been infringed by the manner of his termination. The plaintiff's personnel file showed that the nonrenewal of his contract was based on "inadequate" and "incompetent" performance, an allegation which he denied. The Fifth Circuit decision was controlled by its
very recent decision of Sims v. Fox,'4 which held that liberty is not infringed by "the mere presence of derogatory information in confidential
files." 5 Ortwein held that Sims controlled even though the teacher refuted
the charges.'" The court said, however, that in Sims the charges essentially
had been admitted by the entry of a plea of nolo contendere to criminal
charges. Public dissemination, or the likelihood of public dissemination,
of damaging charges is an essential element of the claimed infringement
of liberty. In both Sims and Ortwein, the public employers had written
policies establishing the confidentiality of personnel files.
The Fifth Circuit held in Hander v. San Jacinto Junior College" that a
discharge of a college faculty member was unconstitutional where it was
based on his wearing a beard in violation of a college grooming regulation.
The court relied heavily upon Lansdale v. Tyler Junior College,'" which
had held that colleges constitutionally could not establish regulations of
hair length for students. The college could not even demonstrate any justification for the grooming standards. The court thus distinguishes college
teachers from such positions as policeman or fireman, for which grooming
standards have been sustained."
Similarly, the court found in Andrews v. Drew Municipal Separate
School District'° that a school district's prohibition of hiring unwed moth12. Id. at 640.
13. 511 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1975).
14. 505 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc).
15. Id. at 863.
16. 511 F.2d at 699.
17. 519 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1975).
18. 470 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1972).
19. See, e.g., Yarborough v. City of Jacksonville, 363 F.Supp. 1176 (M.D. Fla. 1973), aff'd,
504 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1974).
20. 507 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1975).
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ers had no substantial relation to educational objectives and thus violated
both the due process and the equal protection guarantees of the fourteenth
amendment. School administrators argued that unwed parenthood is
prima facie proof of immorality. The court found that the asserted justification created an irrebuttable presumption violative of the due process
clause under Cleveland Board of Education v. La Fleur,2" Vlandis v.
Kline,2" and Stanley v. Illinois.1 Alternatively, the school district contended that unwed parents provided improper role models, but no evidence
demonstrated students were ever aware of the marital or parental status
of their -teachers."4 Finally, there was no evidence that hiring unwed
mothers would encourage school-girl pregnancies. 5 Thus, the prohibition
was not demonstrably related to any valid school objectives. The court
suggested that the rule might establish an impermissible classification
based on sex, 6 but that ground was not explored since even the most
lenient equal protection criteria was not met.
II.

SCHOOL DESEGREGATION

In the main, the Fifth Circuit's decisions on school desegregation in the
past year were applications of well-settled principles of law to various
school systems.
Tasby v. Estes27 was a major decision covering many aspects of the
mandated plan for a unitary school system in Dallas, Texas. The district
court had approved the system's proposed "television plan" for elementary
schools, which established interracial contact between classrooms with
personal visits only once a week. Predictably, the Fifth Circuit held that
the plan did nothing to convert the system to a unitary sytsem, since dual
classrooms were intentionally maintained. The approved plan for secondary schools set a goal of reducing minority student population to 90% in
each school. Again the court found the remedy inadequate, since the setting of this limited goal indicated a lack of bona fide effort to desegregate
fully.3

The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Board of Public Instructionof Polk
County,2 decided that school systems have an overriding affirmative duty
to build new schools where they will promote desegregation. Since the
district court's order in Tasby failed to include such a requirement, it was
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

414 U.S. 632, 94
412 U.S. 441, 93
415 U.S. 645, 92
507 F.2d at 617.
Id.
Id.
517 F.2d 92 (5th
Id. at 104.

29.

395 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1968).

S.Ct. 791, 39 L.Ed.2d 52 (1974).
S.Ct. 2230, 37 L.Ed.2d 63 (1973).
S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972).

Cir. 1975).
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reversed in this respect as well. 30 The district court order with respect to
faculty and staff assignments was, affirmed, however, 31 after representations by the school system that faculty and staff would be assigned essentially in accordance with Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School
32
District.
The Fifth Circuit's summary affirmance of Carr v. Montgomery County
Board of Education3 suggests a reluctance to require large-scale student
transfers, at least where the district court finds that such transfers would
be "disruptive to the educational processes and would place an excessive
and unnecessarily heavy administrative burden on the school system. ' 34 In
dissent, Judge Goldberg stressed his view that Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Board of Education35 required findings either that the failure
to become unitary is not attributable to state action or that no further
remedy is workable .36 The district court had found that any further desegregation beyond the board's proposal would not "accomplish any realistically stable desegregation." 7 The majority appears tacitly to accept the
proposition that the instability of a proposed desegregation plan, because
of white flight as well as substantial increased cost, make further remedies
unworkable and the remedies will not be ordered for elementary schools
at least where all other Green3 requirements are met and the high schools
39
are unitary.
In McNeal v. Tate County School District,0 the court ordered further
relief even though the system was unitary in student assignment, faculty
ratios, transportation and extracurricular activities. Within grades, how30. 517 F.2d at 105. See also Lee v. Autauga County Bd. of Educ., 514 F.2d 646 (5th Cir.
1975).
31. 517 F.2d at 99.
32. 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1969), rev'd and remanded in part on other grounds, 396 U.S.
290, 90 S.Ct. 608, 24 L.Ed.2d 477 (1970).
33. 377 F.Supp. 1123 (M.D. Ala. 1974), aff'd, 511 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir. 1975).
34. 377 F.Supp. at 1129.
35. 402 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1970)1.
36. 511 F.2d at 1380 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). See also Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413
U.S. 189, 93 S.Ct. 2686, 37 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973).
37. 377 F.Supp. at 1132.
38. Green v. School Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 88 S.Ct. 1689, 20 L.Ed.2d
716 (1968).
39. Student assignment was found constitutionally inadequate in the following cases:
Boyd v. Pointe Coupee Parish School Bd., 505 F.2d 632 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Texas
Educ. Agency, 512 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1975); and United States v. Hinds County School Bd.,
516 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1975). In contrast, in Pate v. Dade County School Bd., 509 F.2d 806
(5th Cir. 1975), the Fifth Circuit found that there had not been a sufficient showing to warrant
supplemental relief where the record included evidence that the board voluntarily had undertaken desegregation measures not required by the court's original order. The court also affirmed the district court's holding that the Atlanta school system was unitary and that the
remaining one-race schools were the product of the overwhelming numbers of minority students. Calhoun v. Cook, 522 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1975).
40. 508 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1975).
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ever, students were assigned according to their predicted ability, with the
result that some sections contained one race. While recognizing that ability
grouping may be educationally sound, the court rejected it unless the
system "has operated a unitary system without such assignments for a
sufficient period of time to assure that the underachievement of the slower
groups is not due to yesterday's educational disparities.""
Several cases also presented the question of whether there had been
unconstitutional de facto segregation which requires proof of segregetative
intent. 2 The Fifth Circuit found such intent in Morales v. Shannon,3
United States v. Midland Independent School District," and Tasby v.
Estes.5 In each case, the court found that there historically had been
certain schools known as Mexican-American schools and the defendant
school systems never took any steps to change the de facto segregation even
when they had the opportunity, such as when new schools were needed.
In Tasby, the court noted additionally that the school board had integrated
Mexican-Americans with black students.'"
The 1975 decisions include several outlining faculty rights under school
desegregation plans. Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School
District'7 required that a reduction in the number of teachers or staff be
based on published objective and nondiscriminatory criteria. The Fifth
Circuit held that such a requirement continues until the school system
becomes unitary." In the absence of such criteria, the school system may
dismiss faculty and staff only for just cause, and just cause is limited to
conduct which is "repulsive to the minimum standards of decency."' 9 In
United States v. Coffeeville Consolidated School District,50 charges of incompetency, improper disciplinary measures, and failure to abide by
school regulations of examinations were not just cause where the school
board had failed to adopt objective criteria in accordance with Singleton.',
Singleton criteria are not retroactive, however. 2 Therefore, where a
teacher was dismissed in accordance with Singleton's predecessor, United
41. Id. at 1021. See also Morales v. Shannon, 516 F.2d 411 (5th Cir. 1975).
42. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 93 S.Ct. 2686, 37 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973).
43. 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975).
44. 519 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1975).
45. 517 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1975).
46. Id. at 106. See also United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 467 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1972),
and Comment, De Jure Segregation of Chicanos in Texas Schools, 7 HARv. Civ. RIGHTs-CIv.
LIB. L. REV. 307 (1972).
47. 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1969).
48. United States v. Texas, 509 F.2d 192 (5th Cir. 1975).
49. Thompson v. Madison County Bd. of Educ., 476 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1973).
50. 513 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1975).
51. Singleton also grants faculty and staff the right to recall, a right which the court found
had been denied in Kelly v. West Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 517 F.2d 194 (5th Cir.
1975).
52. Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 453 F.2d 1104, 1113 (5th Cir. 1971).
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States v. Jefferson County Board of Education,53 reinstatement will not be
ordered. Jefferson required that the.school board compare a teacher's qualifications with those of all other teachers in the system if there was a staff
reduction to comply with a desegregation plan. When the teacher cannot
show that staff reduction is a result of desegregation, the court held, he is
not entitled to Jefferson protection.
Cook v. Hudson" held that in an effort to desegregate a public school
system constitntionally could require its teachers to send their children to
public schools. But two separate majority opinions and a dissent were filed,
showing widely divergent views of the panel members. Judge Coleman
would have sustained the regulation under the authority of United Public
Works v.Mitchell" and Pickering v. Board of Education," which recognized that the government has a more substantial interest in regulating
speech and conduct of its employees than in regulation of the general
public. For him, the obvious goal of inspiring public confidence in the
public education system by requiring teacher loyalty to the system is sufficient to sustain the regulation without reference to the relationship of the
regulation to the goal of desegreation. 5
For Judge Roney, however, the validity of the regulation was based, at
least in this instance, on the fact that it was part of the school board's
desegregation effort. Additionally, his concurring opinion noted that the
court below, relying upon expert testimony, had found that the teachers'
conduct in sending their children to private segregated schools adversely
affected their performance in the public school system.5"
Judge Clark dissented. He found that the regulation lacked the necessary precision to override the teachers' fundamental right to choose the
method of educating their own children." The dissent found that the
board's justification for the regulation overemphasized the effect which
this one decision by a teacher would have on his teaching ability, especially
where there was no requirement that other teachers demonstrate any support for desegregation. Judge Clark would have held that the regulation
violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment."0
The varying opinions of the panel members in Cook v. Hudson suggest
that this issue is very much alive in the Fifth Circuit; it certainly is left
unsettled by the majority in the case.
53.
54.
55.

380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967).
511 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1975).
330 U.S. 75, 67 S.Ct. 556, 91 L.Ed.2d 754 (1947).

56.

391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968).

57.
58.
59.

511 F.2d at 749 (Coleman, J., concurring).
Id. at 750 (Roney, J., concurring).
Id. at 757 (Clark, J., dissenting). See Pierce v. Soc. of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct.

571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925).
60. 511 F.2d at 757 (Clark, J., dissenting). See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414
U.S. 632, 94 S.Ct. 791, 39 L.Ed.2d 52 (1974); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 93 S.Ct. 2230,
37 L.Ed.2d 63 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972).
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In two cases, the Fifth Circuit acted to thwart state interference with
court-ordered desegregation. In United States v. Texas,' the court affirmed the district court's preliminary injunction against the state's splintering school districts, which would have the effect of substantially increasing minority student population in the remaining system. 2 In Singleton
VII,' the court affirmed an injunction against the state's withholding
funds from the Jackson school district. The court did not find it necessary
to rule on the constitutionality of a state statute prohibiting the expenditure of state funds for busing, because it affirmed the district court's finding that busing would be paid for entirely by local fumds.6 4
III.

STUDENT DISCIPLINE

In Jenkins v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 5 the court considered
both substantive and procedural prerequisites to the imposition of sanctions on college students. The plaintiffs had been charged with instigating
a boycott which led to property damage and disruption of the campus, but
the plaintiffs themselves had not participated in the criminal activities.
Several procedural points were decided. First, the court held that fair
notice of the charges was required but that the charges "need not be drawn
with the precision of a criminal indictment.""6 By reference to the administrative record, the court found that the students had actual notice and that
the defense was adequately prepared to attempt to refute the administration's case. Second, the fact that the members of the school's hearing board
were school employees, appointed to the board by the college president,
who was a chief witness against the students, was held not to injure the
board's impartiality. 7 The Fifth Circuit requires evidence of bias or prejudice, not conjecture.
The court also considered plaintiffs' substantive claims that their activity was constitutionally protected and not subject to disciplinary sanctions, even though the sanctions were imposed in accordance with procedural due process. The applicable constitutional standard is whether the
proscribed conduct involves "material and substantial interference with
the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of an educational institution."" The students also challenged the college regulations
61. 508 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1975).
62. See United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484, 92 S.Ct. 2214,
33 L.Ed.2d 75 (1972).
63. Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate School Dist., 509 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1975). This
case has become known as Singleton VII in a controversy spanning more than 11 years.
64. Id. at 819.
65. 506 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1975).
66. Id. at 1000.
67. Id. at 1003.
68. Id. at 1002. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969); Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d
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for vagueness and overbreadth. The Fifth Circuit, however, continued to
uphold broadly worded school regulatioms giving administrators discretion
in disciplinary matters as long as there is no evidence to show that the
regulation is "in fact being used to infringe on first amendment rights." 9
Since the appellants' conduct was not itself constitutionally protected and
they had had adequate notice of the charges against them in the disciplinary proceedings, the regulations were sustained. Judge Tuttle vigorously
dissented, 0 finding that appellants' conduct was constitutionally protected since they did not personally participate in campus disruption. In
his view, recent speech-conduct cases?' permit imposition of discipline only
if the students' own behavior is unprotected.

IV.

ABORTION

Notwithstanding the dramatic effect of Roe v. Wade 2 and Doe v.
Bolton, 3 issues related to abortion remain to be decided. The Fifth Circuit
considered several this year.
Not surprisingly, the court held in Spears v. Circuit Court" that a state
constitutionally may prohibit non-physicians from performing abortions,
even in the first trimester, and that the meaning of "physician" was clear
enough to notify the defendant that his conduct was proscribed.
In Greco v. Orange Memorial Hospital Corp. ,5 the court refused to interfere with the policy of a private hospital prohibiting the performance of
elective abortions. Although the hospital was built by the county on county
land and was funded under the Hill-Burton Act, 6 the court held that there
was no state action involved, thus precluding a physician's suit under 42
U.S.C.A. §1983.17 The court distinguished Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority5 on two grounds: first, racial discrimination was not involved,
and second, the county and hospital were not interdependent. Moreover,
there was no evidence that the county had any role in the adoption or
enforcement of the anti-abortion policy. The court's reading of Jackson v.
Metropolitan Co.7 9 requires that there be not only state regulation but also
749 (5th Cir. 1966); Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
69. Murray v. West Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 472 F.2d 438, 442 (5th Cir. 1973).
70. 506 F.2d at 1007.
71. Tinker, Blackwell and Burnside, supra note 68.
72. 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973).
73. 410 U.S. 179, 93 S.Ct. 739, 35 L.Ed.2d 201 (1973).
74. 517 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1975).
75. 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1975).
76. 42 U.S.C.A. §291 et. seq. (1974).
77. An otherwise private act is "state action" if the state significantly involves itself in
the activity or when the private entity has assured a public function. 513 F.2d at 878. See
Comment, State Action and the Burger Court, 60 U. VA. L. REV. 840 (1974).
78. 365 U.S. 715, 81 S.Ct. 856, 61 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961).
79. 419 U.S. 345, 95 S.Ct. 449, 42 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974).
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a nexus between the state and the challenged action. As the opinion notes,
this requirement probably constricts "state action" more than earlier racial discrimination cases. 8 Judge Clark in his concurring opinion finds
state action because of the "symbiotic relationship" between the county
and hospital, which comes within Burton but he nevertheless agrees with
the result, concluding that the Constitution does not require the county to
furnish facilities for abortions.8 '
In Poe v. Gerstein,8 1the court held that the spousal consent and parental
consent requirements of the Florida abortion statute were unconstitutional. While Roe and Doe left unresolved the issue of spousal consent, the
rationale of those decisions certainly left slight hope for upholding such a
requirement. Since Roe held that the challenged statute infringed a
woman's right to privacy, the man appears to lack any legal standing to
complain. The court rejected the state's argument that the statute preserved the marital relationship and found instead that the consent requirement was an intrusion into private decision.13 The court was sympathetic
to the argument that the husband had an interest in the fetus, but it held
that paternal rights have never extended to a fetus and that Stanley v.
Illinois"4 has not altered the father's status in this respect. 5 Finally, the
court concluded that the father's potential to procreate was constitutionally protected' but that procreation could not be guaranteed by the state
in contravention of the woman's right to abortion.
The constitutionality of parental consent, also decided in Poe v.
Gerstein, was not forecast in Roe and Doe because different interests must
be weighed. Although the Florida abortion statute challenged in Poe specifically required parental consent for an abortion, parental consent would
be required for any surgical procedure absent a special exclusion for abortions, because a minor lacks the capacity to consent to surgery. The parental consent requirement, then, is no different for abortions than for other
medical procedures which must be decided upon by the parent, the physician and the minor.8" The finding of unconstitutionality of the parental
consent requirement is a step beyond the command of Roe that first
trimester abortions be allowed on the same basis as other surgical procedures.
80. 513 F.2d at 881.
81. Id. at 882-83 (Clark, J., concurring).
82. 517 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975).
83. Id. at 792-93.
84. 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed. 2d 551 (1972).
85. 517 F.2d at 795. See Note, Abortion: The Father's Rights, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 441
(1973).
86. 517 F.2d at 796, citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 86 L.Ed.
1655 (1942).
87. 517 F.2d at 794.
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The Fifth Circuit's analysis began with the recognition that the fourteenth amendment is not for adults alone."0 Thus, the court looked at the
minor vis-a-vis the state and found that the right to privacy, recognized
in Roe to extend to the abortion decision, is a fundamental right for minors
as well, and state interference therefore would be tolerated only upon the
most compelling grounds.0 The court considered but rejected four justifications for the requirement. First, the court found no factual basis for the
argument that the requirement deterred illicit sexual conduct. Second,
despite its recognition that one justification for the statute was to prevent
improvident decision-making, the court found the means used to achieve
this aim questionable. According to the court, the physician is in a position
to counsel the minor objectively, and, on the other hand, the parents might
not be acting in the child's best interests. Fostering parental control and
maintenance of the family unit were viewed by the Fifth Circuit as insufficient justifications for the requirement. The requirement was labeled "a
blunt instrument" for maintaining parental control, since the minor's decision to abort despite her parent's expressed wishes indicated to the court
that parental control already was diminished, if not evaporated. 0 Similarly, the court concluded that the family unit would not be strengthened
by the requirement in a family already fractured by a minor's pregnancy.
The court also concluded that the parental consent requirement actually
interfered with familial relationships and family privacy.
The parental consent issue is a particularly difficult one because previous Supreme Court decisions have not recognized the possibility of
parent-child conflict and have not determined how the state must deal
with this potentiality in family law. 9' But the Fifth Circuit's analysis in Poe
does not adequately recognize the impact of the holding on the parentchild relationships. At common law, parents were required to provide medical care and treatment for their children, and because of the child's lack
of capacity to contract, the parent's consent was needed." Poe failed to
acknowledge that legal incapacity reflects the scientific fact that children
generally are incapable of making mature decisions. The maturation process varies widely among individuals, of course, but heretofore the state
has not been precluded from protecting all children because some legal
3
minors might be capable of independent decision making.
By invalidating the parental consent requirement for abortions, the
88. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733,
21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969), and In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967).
89. 517 F.2d at 791, citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147
(1973).
90. 517 F.2d at 792-93.
91. But see Justice Douglas's dissent in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526,
32 L.Ed. 2d 15 (1972).
92. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 452.
93. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 88 S.Ct. 1274, 20 L.Ed.2d 195 (1968).
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court distinguishes abortion from other medical and surgical procedures
which will still require parental consent and thus elevates a minor's right
to an abortion to a unique constitutional status. There are distinctions
between abortions and other procedures because of the age of the minor
and the high potential for parent-child conflicts. Whether these distinctions justify a different constitutional standard and diminution of the
parent's role is questionable.
V.

ELECTIONS

Most of the Fifth Circuit's work in the elections area focused on apportionment of local governmental bodies. Robinson v. Commissioners
Court,94 Bradas v. Rapides ParishPolice Jury,95 Gilbert v. Sterrett," Wallace v. House97 and Perry v. City of Opelousas" scrutinized charges that
minority voting strength was being diluted by apportionment plans. Resolution of a dilution challenge requires a detailed analysis of the history
and present electoral patterns within the governmental unit. 9
Of the 1975 cases, Wallace v. House provides the most exhaustive review
of the pertinent dilution cases. In Wallace and in Perry, the court upheld
mixed apportionment plans providing for the election of one at-large member with the majority of members elected by district.
Bradas v. Rapides Parish Police Jury is one of a few Fifth Circuit cases
reversing a finding of the dilution in all at-large systems. Following White,
the court looked at the record to determine whether the challengers had
produced evidence demonstrating that the minority lacked access to the
political process. "The single glaring fact that no black has ever been
elected to a parish office does not by itself support judicial nullification of
a reapportionment plan."' 00
In Gilbert v. Sterrett, the challengers had alleged a gerrymander or
dilution in the drawing of the lines of single-member districts. The contention was based primarily on the testimony of an analyst who predicted that
minority growth would be primarily in a district with present low minority
population so that there was little possiblity of a minority candidate's
being elected until 1985. The court concluded that the reapportionment
need not, and probably should not, attempt to anticipate population
94. 505 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1974).
95. 508 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1975).
96. 509 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir. 1975).
97. 515 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1975).
98. 515 F.2d 639 (5th Cir. 1975).
99. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973); Zimmer v.
McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc); Turner v. McKeithen, 490 F.2d 191 (5th
Cir. 1973). Zimmer has been argued before the Supreme Court, but no decision has been
announced.
100. 508 F.2d at 1112.
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shifts, because such a projection might raise one-man, one-vote prob0
lems."
The Voting Rights Act of 1965102 requires that any civil action brought
pursuant to the statute be determined by a court of three judges, so circuit
courts rarely determine Voting Rights Act issues. 03 Pitts v. Busbee °4 is an
exception. The properly convened three-judge district court had enjoined
a new apportionment plan for the Fulton County, Georgia, Board of Commissioners and had remanded the case to the originating district judge for
resolution of the remaining issues, which included a constitutional attack
on the earlier plan. The single judge held that the pre-1965 plan was not
in effect because of repealing clauses in the new plan and adopted an
interim plan for election which included suspension of the general majority
vote requirement. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court had "addressed the wrong issue,"' 0 5 since the Voting Rights Act froze new election
laws in covered jurisdictions' 0 and thus left pre-1965 laws unaffected. Pitts
was remanded for adjudication of the constitutionality of the at-large election system in accordance with the criteria of White v. Regester.10.1
A struggle between factions of the Mississippi Democratic Party reached
the Fifth Circuit in Riddell v. National Democratic Party.70 Pursuant to
the state's party registration statute, the "regulars" registered the name
"Democratic Party of the State of Mississippi" in 1950. However, in 1968
and in 1972, the "loyalists" were recognized at the convention by the
National Democratic Party. The "regulars" sued to enjoin the "loyalists"
from using the name "Democratic Party," and the "loyalists" counterclaimed, alleging that the registration statute was unconstitutional. The
statute precluded a political party from using or registering "any name or
part thereof which has already been registered.
..."I0 The court recognized that the registration statute furthered the legitimate state interest
of preventing voter confusion and deception but also impermissibly re0 9
stricted the ability of new "Democratic" parties to gain popular support.
The statute was held unconstitutional to the extent it prohibited a new
Democratic party from using the word "Democratic" in a way which would
not be confusing to a majority of the voters.
Adams v. Askew" O held that candidate filing fees of 3% of the annual
salary for the office for partisan candidates and 5% for non-partisan candi101. 509 F.2d at 1392. See Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 86 S.Ct. 1286, 16 L.Ed.2d
376 (1967).
102. 42 U.S.C.A. §1973c (Supp. 1976).
103. Sumer County Democratic Exec. Comm. v. Dearnan, 514 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir. 1975).
104. 511 F.2d 126 (5th Cir. 1975).
105. Id. at 128.
106. See Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 538, 93 S.Ct. 1702, 36 L.Ed.2d 472 (1972).
106.1 412 U.S. 735, 93 S. Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1972).
107. 508 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1975).
108. Miss. Code Ann. §3107-01 (1957).
109. See Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 94 S.Ct. 303, 38 L.Ed.2d 260 (1973).
110. 511 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1975).
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dates were not unconstitutional as applied to candidates able to pay such
fees. Restrictions on candidates do not abridge fundamental rights unless
they abridge the right to vote."' Thus, where voters are unable to vote for
serious but indigent candidates, the state's interests are not sufficiently
compelling to sustain the abridgment. But where the effect is only on the
candidates, a reasonable filing fee is constitutional, according to the Fifth
Circuit, because it helps discourage frivolous candidates and thus prevents
voter confusion.
VI.

OTHER DECISIONS

In Tyler v. Vickery," 2 the court considered and rejected several challenges to the Georgia bar examination procedure in a suit which had been
filed on behalf of the class of black applicants taking the examination. The
court first affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment with
respect to the claim of intentional discrimination. While recognizing that
summary judgments seldom are appropriate in discrimination cases, the
court concluded that the applicant-challengers had not met their burden
of showing an opportunity for discrimination under Federal Rule of Civil
3
Procedure 56(c).1
The Fifth Circuit also rejected the contention that the bar examination
should be judged by the criteria mandated by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission when employment tests are challenged." 4 Recognizing that some circuits had applied Title VII standards to public employment testing, the court decided that its decision in Allen v. City of
Mobile"' foreclosed that argument in this circuit. The court found that
Geduldig v. Aiello"' also supported the view that the fourteenth amendment is not coextensive with Title VII."17 The court then held that the
appropriate equal protection test is the traditional rational basis test, since
the disparity between passing and failing applicants was not based on
race."' The statistical disparity was insufficient to change the equal protection standard. Measured by the rational basis test, the Georgia bar
exam, as administered, was found to have "rational connection with an
111. Id. at 703. See Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 94 S.Ct. 1315, 39 L.Ed.2d 702 (1974),
and Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 92 S.Ct. 849, 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972).
112. 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1975).
113. Id. at 1093. The court found the plaintiffs' contention that the examiners could
detect "Black English" "unreasonable as a matter of law." Id. at 1094.
114. 42 U.S.C.A. §2000(e) (1974), 29 C.F.R. §1607 (1975). See Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971).
115. 466 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1972).
116. 417 U.S. 484, 94 S.Ct. 2485, 41 L.Ed.2d 256 (1974).
117. See Communication Workers of America v. American T. & T. Co., 513 F.2d 1024 (2nd
Cir. 1975).
118. See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 92 S.Ct. 1260, 32 L.Ed.2d 369 (1972), and
James v. Valtierva, 402 U.S. 137, 91 S.Ct. 1331, 28 L.Ed.2d 67 (1971).

1976]

CIVIL RIGHTS

applicant's fitness to practice law.""'
Finally, the court rejected the appellants' claim that the due process
clause required a hearing for a failing applicant. The court said reexamination more efficiently protected the interests of the examinees.
Joining the overwhelming majority of courts to consider the issue, the
Fifth Circuit upheld a city residence requirement for municipal firemen in
Wright v. City of Jackson.'2 ° The court applied the traditional equal protection standard after finding that there was no fundamental constitutional right of intrastate travel.'' The following interests among others
were found sufficient as a rational basis for the restriction: promotion of
ethnic balance, reduction of high employment rates, improvement of relations between residents and city employees, and increase in the employees'
feeling of a personal stake in the city."'
The traditional and less stringent equal protection standard was applied
again in Parish v. National Collegiate Athletic Association,'" this time to
the NCAA eligibility rule requiring that first-year students have a predicted average of 1.600.114 Under the rational basis standard, the rule was
upheld. The due process challenge also was rejected; the court found that
the prospect of playing in NCAA-sanctioned games was neither a liberty
nor a property interest requiring procedural safeguards.' 5
The only noteworthy case arising from the public accommodation provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964126 was Rousseve v. Shape Spa for
Health and Beauty, Inc.' 7 The only issue was whether the health and
exercise clubs were "places of entertainment" and thus subject to the antidiscrimination requirement. A majority of the court concluded that the
clubs, like YMCA facilities, were "places of entertainment" as that phrase
had been interpreted by the Supreme Court in Daniel v. Paul.'8 Judge
Ainsworth, dissenting, thought that a health spa simply did not come
within the commonly accepted definition of "place of entertainment.",,
In a case which the Fifth Circuit believes is of first impression among
the circuit courts, Maker v. City of New Orleans,'° the court upheld the
New Orleans regulatory scheme for buildings in the Vieux Carr6 (French
119. 517 F.2d at 1101. Judge Adams dissented on the ground that the case should not have
been decided on a motion for summary judgment.
120. 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1975).
121. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969).
122. 506 F.2d at 903-04, citing Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal.3d 129, 514 P.2d 433, 109
Cal. Rptr. 852 (1973).
123. 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975).
124. See Associated Students, Inc. v. NCAA, 493 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1974).
125. 506 F.2d at 1034.
126. 42 U.S.C.A. §2000a(b)(3) (1974).
127. 516 F.2d 64 (5th Cir. 1975).
128. 395 U.S. 298, 89 S.Ct. 1697, 23 L.Ed. 2d 318 (1969).
129. 516 F.2d at 68 (Ainsworth,J.,dissenting).
130. 516 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1975).
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Quarter). The plaintiff wanted to raze the Victorian cottage which he
owned in the Quarter, but an ordinance required a permit to perform
construction, alteration or demolition work. Additionally, the ordinance
imposed an affirmative duty on an owner to maintain the property.
The court began its substantive analysis 31 by scrutinizing the legislative
purpose for the ordinance, which was to preserve buildings which have
"architectural and historical value." The police power, of course, includes
"aesthetic as well as monetary" interests.'32 The court also took note of
"the nationwide sentiment for preserving the country's heritage." ' Having found these purposes constitutional, the court examined the means of
pursuing them. The plaintiff complained that the ordinance lacked objective standards for the administrative agency, but the court determined
that the expert members would be guided by historical records and a
contemporary independent study. Moreover, the denial of a demolition
permit was not found to be a "taking," since the property was not worthless as a result of the regulation134 -even though, as the court recognized,
the ordinance could have been less harsh and still have achieved its purpose. Finally, the court held that it was not unreasonable to require owners
in the French Quarter to maintain their buildings in accordance with the
ordinance standards, although the court emphasized that the requirement
might be oppressive as applied to different circumstances.
In Calley v. Callaway," the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, made several
far-reaching decisions. William L. Calley, Jr., convicted in a military court
martial of premeditated murder and aggravated assault with intent to
commit murder in connection with the infamous My Lai massacre, was
granted a writ of habeas corpus by the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Georgia. The government appealed.
The first issue facing the Fifth Circuit in the Calley case was the proper
scope of review to be given by a civil appellate court to a military court's
decision, after that decision had been reviewed through the entire military
justice system and eventually by the President of the United States. The
Fifth Circuit faced the uncertain state of the law which had resulted from
the decision in Burns v. Wilson, '1 which recognized that, although civil
courts could review decisions of military courts in a habeas corpus proceeding, the scope of that review was much narrower than in civil cases and
131. There is also an explanation of the application of the principles of res judicata and
collateral estoppel, since the plaintiff previously had presented his claims to state courts. Id.
at 1055.
132. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33, 75 S.Ct. 98, 102, 99 L.Ed. 27, 38 (1959). See also
Stone v. City of Maitland, 446 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1971).
133. 516 F.2d at 1061.
134. Id. at 1064-65. See Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 82 S.Ct. 987, 8 L.Ed.2d
130 (1969).
135. 519 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1975). See a related discussion of Calley in Walls,
Constitutional-CriminalLaw in this volume, infra.
136. 346 U.S. 137, 73 S.Ct. 1045, 97 L.Ed. 1508 (1953).
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was limited to the determination of whether the military had given "fair
consideration" to each of the claims of the petitioner.' 7
Recognizing that cases interpreting the Burns decision were in a fair
state of disarray, 3 1 the Fifth Circuit set a new standard for review by civil
courts in habeas corpus review of military proceedings in which the petitioner claimed to have been deprived of due process of law.
In making this determination, four principal inquiries constitute the new
standard delineated in Calley: (1) the asserted error must be of a substantial constitutional dimension or so fundamental as to have resulted in a
gross miscarriage of justice; (2) the issue must be one of law rather than
of disputed fact already determined by military tribunals; (3) factors peculiar to the military or important military considerations require a different
constitutional standard from that exercised in ordinary cases; (4) the military courts must have given inadequate consideration to the issue raised
in the habeas corpus proceeding and have applied the proper legal standard to the issue.
During his trial, Lt. Calley had attempted to obtain, by subpoena, all
of the evidence and testimony which had been secured during the independent hearings held before the U.S. House Armed Services Committee,
headed by Congressman F. Edward Hebert. Those requests of the defense
had been denied by the military judge hearing the original case. Pursuant
to the rules of military procedure governing the original Calley trial, extensive discovery was extended to the defense in the case. The Fifth Circuit,
in upholding this denial of additional discovery, rejected the defense
suggestion that Brady v. Maryland' encompassed all material which
might have led a jury to entertain a reasonable doubt as to a defendant's
guilt. Since the defense was unable to make the necessary showing of
materiality concerning all of the evidence presented to the Hebert committee and since the defense possessed essentially all the information available to the prosecution, the Fifth Circuit indicated, it was not unreasonable to require some showing of justification for Calley's assertion that the
denial of this information deprived him of a fair trial. The Fifth Circuit
went further and indicated that this denial of information was not in
violation of the Jencks Act 4 ° because that act does not in and of itself set
forth constitutional requirements but sets forth merely rules of evidence.
In addition, the Jencks Act refers only to civil tribunals. The Supreme
Court decision in United States v. Augenblick'4' supports the proposition
that failure to provide the defense with prior testimony of witnesses is not
an error of constitutional proportions. On this basis, the Fifth Circuit ruled
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

519 F.2d at 197.
The cases are discussed at 519 F.2d at 198.
373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).
18 U.S.C.A. §3500 (1969).
393 U.S. 348, 89 S.Ct. 528, 21 L.Ed.2d 537 (1968).
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that the lower federal court had erred in indicating that denial by a military judge of this testimony to defendant Calley was reviewable by a federal civil court.
The third, and perhaps the -most important, ruling made in the Calley
v. Calaway case was on the issue of pre-trial publicity. The military court
martial against Lt. Calley was one of the most publicized cases in recent
times. In considering Calley's claims that pre-trial publicity deprived him
of his right to an impartial jury and a fair trial, the Fifth Circuit reiterated
the general rule that a defendant has the burden on appeal of proving
actual jury prejudice if his conviction is to be reversed on grounds of
prejudicial pre-trial publicity. The Fifth Circuit emphasized again its refusal to accept the position that "prominence brings prejudice" and indicated that the courts should not expect jurors to live in isolation from the
events in their community. The court also said that the publicity surrounding the My Lai incident and the Calley trial was not of a virulent
and oppressive nature but consisted of objective statements of facts and
straight news stories concerning the incidents.
In determining whether or not actual prejudice existed on the bench of
military officers who made the determinations in the Calley trial, the court
determined from the record that the officers' statements that they would
not be influenced in any way by the publicity with which they had been
in contact should be accepted: The Calley ruling in this regard follows the
3
earlier Fifth Circuit decision in Murphy v. Florida.
The Calley case is of particular interest in light of the recent three-judge
Fifth Circuit opinion in the case of United States v. Williams. 144 In
Williams, the court stated that pre-trial publicity and the closing argument of the prosecutor did not individually constitute error but that the
tandem effect of the two did constitute reversible error. The Fifth Circuit
emphasized the pervasive nature of the publicity and its probable effect
on the trial.
VII.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

Procedural law continues to be increasingly important in the civil rights
area. Many civil right actions in the last year turned on specialized procedural issues. While it is not possible to include all cases discussing procedural issues, this section attempts to highlight important procedural holdings.
In constitutional challenges to federal statutes, plaintiffs cannot rely on
the usual statute"' conferring jurisdiction over challenges to state action.
142. 519 F.2d at 205.
143. 495 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1974), afJ'd, 421 U.S. 794, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 44 L.Ed.2d 589 (1975).
144. 523 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1975). A petition for rehearing on behalf of the government
is pending in the Williams case.
145. 28 U.S.C.A. §§1331(3) and 1331(4) (1966).
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In Winningham v. HUD"' the Fifth Circuit held that 28 U.S.C.A. §1337
granted district courts subject matter jurisdiction over a suit alleging an
equal protection challenge to 12 U.S.C.A. §1701s(c)(2)(D), which grants
housing subsidies only to persons moving from substandard housing. The
court held that § 1337 must be construed broadly to confer federal jurisdiction whenever the commerce clause is one of the bases for the statute.
Since one purpose of the rent subsidies was to encourage housing construction, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction."'
Where state statutes are challenged, the Supreme Court has developed
the abstention doctrine to avoid needless federal-state conflict.'48 In a case
attacking state administrative orders, a majority of the Fifth Circuit found
that abstention was not required because the state statute pursuant to
which the orders had been entered had been construed on several occasions
by the state court."' Judge Dyer, in dissent, concluded that abstention was
nevertheless appropriate, because, if the orders had been appealed to state
courts, it was likely that they would have been overturned there, thus
obviating the need for federal court action altogether. Judge Dyer concluded that lack of clarity in the controlling state statute was not necessarily a prerequisite to abstention if there was another way federal court
litigation could be avoided.
The court decided in Korioth v. Briscoe'5 that the taxpayer challenging
a statute setting up state planning agencies lacked standing because he
had shown no concrete injury.
District courts are prohibited by 28 U.S.C.A. §1341 from enjoining the
assessment, levy or collection of state taxes where there is a state remedy.
In Framel v. Schrader,'5 ' landowners claimed that street improvement
assessments were unconstitutional under both the due process and the
equal protection clauses and argued that such an assessment was not a tax.
Reviewing congressional intent in adopting §1341, the court found no basis
for adopting a narrow construction of "tax." It concluded that assessments
for street improvements were taxes and affirmed the dismissal of the
complaint.
Before the United States can file suit pursuant to the Fair Housing
Act,'52 the Attorney General must find reasonable cause to believe that
the potential defendant is engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination and that the case raises an issue of general public importance. In
United States v. Northside Realty Associates,'5 the court held that the
146. 512 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1975).
147. A district court does not have jurisdiction where the only federal question is raised
by the defense. Lucas v. Hope, 515 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1975).
148. See, e.g., Reetz v. Boganich, 397 U.S. 82, 90 S.Ct. 788, 25 L.Ed.2d 68 (1970), and
Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941).
149. John Manville Products Corp. v. Doyal, 510 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1975).
150. 523 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1975).
151. 505 F.2d 1310 (5th Cir. 1975).
152. 42 U.S.C.A. §3613 (1973).
153. 518 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1975).
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Attorney General was not required to review the facts after a suit was filed
and that a determination of which facts raise an issue of general public
importance was within the Attorney General's discretion and was not reviewable by the court.'
In Robinson v. Wichita Falls & North Texas Community Action Corp.'55
the plaintiff alleged pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. §1983 that his discharge
from a community action agency violated the due process clause. The
defendant contended that it was a private corporation and therefore no
claim had been stated under the Civil Rights Act. The court, however,
suggested that not every community action agency was private and that
the interrelationship with the state might subject such a corporation to 42
U.S.C.A. §1983. The issue was not authoritatively decided, however, because the court also concluded that there had been no deprivation of procedural due process in any event.' 6
Private individuals are liable under §1983 if they act in concert with
public employees to deprive a plaintiff of his civil rights.'57 Such concerted
action was found in Smith v. Brookshire Bros., Inc., 5 1 where the defendant
department store was proved to have had a pre-arranged plan with local
police to pick up alleged shoplifters without independent investigation by
the police. Judge Gee dissented, finding that all the record demonstrated
was that the police had agreed, in accordance with universal practice, to
pick up shoplifters so that the victim would not have to bring them to the
police station. Moreover, he warned that the majority position seemed to
hold private citizens responsible for impermissible police action.'59
The Fifth Circuit in Westberry v. Gilman Paper Co.'60 held that 42
U.S.C.A. §1985(3) provides a federal claim against "purely private parties" for a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of his civil rights. Griffin v.
Breckinridge'6' had found a cause of action where black citizens had been
stopped on a highway and beaten by white citizens, but the constitutional
basis for federal jurisdiction was the thirteenth amendment. In Westberry,
154. In Northside Realty Associates, the court suggests that Appellants' Brief in Support
of the Petition for Rehearing was almost contemptuous and makes it clear that certain
arguments reached the outer limits of advocacy.
155. 507 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1975).
156. The most exhaustive discussion by the Fifth Circuit of the state action requirement
during the last year was found in Greco v. Orange Memorial Hospital Corp., 513 F.2d 873
(5th Cir. 1975). See text accompanying note 75, supra. See also Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d
1028 (5th Cir. 1975) (association acted under color of state law because state schools played
a substantial role in the association's program); Blouin v" Loyola Univ., 506 F.2d 20 (5th Cir.
1975) (university is not subject to a §1983 suit even though it received federal and state
money, operated a radio station licensed by the Federal Communications Commission, and
enjoyed federal and state tax exemptions).
157. Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970).
158. 519 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1975).
159. Id. at 97 (Gee, J., dissenting).
160. 507 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1975).
161. 403 U.S. 88, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 29 L.Ed.338 (1971).
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the plaintiff was white, and he claimed that the defendant conspired to kill
him and did actually have him removed from his job because of his unpopular pbsitions on environmental and taxation issues. The court characterized Westberry's complaint as an allegation of a conspiracy to deprive
him of first amendment rights. By reviewing the legislative history of the
fourteenth amendment, the court concluded that section 5 was intended
to authorize legislation reaching private acts. Support was also found in
the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Guest,'62 in which six
justices had concluded that section 5 authorized remedies for purely private acts. '6
Citing the exhaustive opinion of the district court,"4 Judge Morgan objected that the majority decision opened the door for a "general federal tort
law." While the majority found factors limiting the availability of the
remedy which it had created, " the recognition of a federal claim under the
circumstances of Westberry suggests a fertile field for litigation.
Under §1983 there is a claim against any "person" acting under color of
state law who deprives another of his civil rights. Adkins v. Duval County
School Board'66 held that a school board is not a person within the meaning
of this section and affirmed a dismissal of a complaint. In reaching this
conclusion, the court relied on Kenosha v. Bruno,'67 which held that a
municipality was not a person within the meaning of §1983. No legal
distinction was found between school boards and municipalities.
In Sweet v. Childs,'65 the court held that the defendant's action (or
inaction) of which plaintiff complains must be a proximate cause of the
injury. The plaintiffs were suspended by a local school board, and the state
school board took no remedial action. Relying on Florida cases, the Fifth
Circuit found that discipline was a local matter and that the inaction of
the state board defendants was not the cause for the deprivation alleged. 69
In Sapp v. Renfroe,'7 0 the Fifth Circuit applied the standard announced
by the Supreme Court in Wood v. Strickland'7' for determining public
officials' liability for damages. The school board required ROTC before
162. 383 U.S. 745, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966).
163. See also Action v. Gammon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc), and Richardson
v. Miller, 446 F.2d 1247 (3rd Cir. 1971).
164. Westberry v. Gilman Paper Co., 60 F.R.D. 447 (1974).
165. 507 F.2d at 215.
166. 511 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1975).
167. 412 U.S. 507, 93 S.Ct. 2222, 37 L.Ed. 2d 109 (1973).
168. 507 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1975).
169. Causation also was found lacking in Palmer v. Hall, 517 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1975),
with respect to the liability of the mayor of Macon, Georgia, who had issued a shoot-to-kill
order. The evidence in the record did not support a finding that there was a connection
between the order and the shooting by a police officer about 20 months later. See also
Chestnut v. City of Quincy, 519 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1975).
170. 511 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1975).
171. 420 U.S. 308, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975).
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high school graduation, and theplaintiff sued to enjoin the requirement.
Prior to the district court decision, he graduated from another school for
which he had to pay tuition and claimed compensatory damages. The
court found that the constitutionality of a ROTC requirement was not
clear.'72 Individual defendants therefore were not liable in damages for
enforcing the ROTC policy, since Wood approved the imposition of damages only where "clearly established constitutional rights" are violated.'73
Judgments awarding damages against two colleges were affirmed in
Hander v. San Jacinto Junior College District'4 and Schiff v. Williams. 75
In Hander, a teacher was ordered reinstated and back pay awarded.
Back pay would not be authorized against a state under the eleventh
amendment, as construed in Edelman v. Jordan."6 However, the Fifth
Circuit found that a Texas college district does not stand in the shoes of
the state but is a mere political subdivision without eleventh amendment
protection.'77 In reaching this conclusion, the court has ignored the preliminary question of whether the school district is a "person" within the meaning of §1983 so that it is a proper defendant. Adkins v. Duval County
School Board"' would appear to answer that question negatively, thus
precluding the imposition of damages.
A somewhat different issue is raised in Schiff, where the court specified
that a judgment against an individual defendant was to be paid from a
fund of student activity fees rather than from appropriated funds. The
defendant, a college president, fired the three plaintiffs from positions at
the college newspaper, an action which the court found violated the students' first amendment rights clearly established, according to the court,
79
in Bazaar v. Fortune.
The Fifth Circuit's apparent interpretation of Wood v. Strickland is that
a circuit decision clearly establishes the law, so personal liability may be
predicated on failure to abide thereby. In view of the numerous significant
constitutional issues on which the circuit courts disagree, this standard
limits the immunity recognized by Wood; if the circuits disagree, then
surely a constitutional right is not "unquestioned."'110
Thus in Schiff an award of nominal compensatory damages was affirmed, as was the back pay award which was to come from the activity
fees. The court was of the opinion that since the back pay was not from
the state treasury, Edelman did not preclude the award. Even though the
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fund was handled differently from general revenue, it was public money,
collected and disbursed in accordance with state law. Siphoning money
from a special public fund has the same effect on that fund as an award
against the general treasury. The distinction is whether the individual
defendant or the state is expected to pay. If it is the state, as it was in
Schiff, then the judgment should be precluded by Edelman.

